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The Inequality of Participation:
Re-examining the Role of Social Stratiﬁ cation and 
Post-Communism on Political Participation in Europe*
MICHAEL L. SMITH**
Institute of Sociology AS CR, Prague
Abstract: This article compares the determinants of political participation, 
from voting and signing petitions to boycotting, across 23 European coun-
tries, posing the question whether and to what degree social inequalities in 
political participation differ between post-communist and Western countries. 
The data for the analysis is from the second round of the ESS survey, con-
ducted in 2004–2005. The analysis focuses on the role of education, occupa-
tion, and gender in shaping the chances of engaging in political action, while 
also controlling for a range of sociological, political, and demographic vari-
ables. Interaction effects between individual variables and a post-communist 
dummy variable are used to directly compare the statistical signiﬁ cance of 
the difference in coefﬁ cients between post-communist and Western countries. 
The article ﬁ nds that the observed effects of the post-communist context are 
actually accounted for by the indirect effects of a number of individual-level 
variables. In particular, education, occupation, and gender have stronger ef-
fects in post-communist countries than Western countries on many forms of 
political participation; in other words, the post-communist countries exhibit 
somewhat larger inequalities in political participation than in the West.
Keywords: political participation, political behaviour, social inequality, social 
stratiﬁ cation, post-communism
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Introduction
In most democracies around the world, citizens have a range of mechanisms, 
in addition to elections, through which they can voice political discontent or 
satisfaction, inﬂ uence political decision-making, or bring about policy change. 
Civic initiatives, petitions, boycotting, demonstrating, and joining civic and po-
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litical organisations are some of the ways citizens can make their voice heard. 
Numerous scholars have argued that such forms of non-electoral political par-
ticipation can have an important inﬂ uence on a democratic political system: they 
help ensure the accountability of public ofﬁ cials by providing information about 
citizens’ preferences [Innes and Booher 2004]; they can improve decisions by in-
corporating citizens’ local knowledge and experience [Fischer 2000]; and they 
can help remedy political injustice in decisions by providing a voice for the less 
advantaged [Fraser 2003, 2008]. Thus, a number of democratic theorists envision 
that the proper institutionalisation of different avenues of political participation 
should reduce political inequalities that are known to exist in electoral processes, 
rather than increase inequalities by providing new ways for the well off to secure 
advantages. 
The degree to which citizens as a whole participate in politics has become a 
pressing issue in many countries where voter turnout and civic engagement have 
been undergoing long-term decline. In post-communist countries, debates about 
political participation are often rooted in Marc Morjé Howard’s ‘weakness of civil 
society’ hypothesis, according to which citizens in post-communist countries ex-
hibit lower levels of civic and political engagement compared to other democra-
cies due to the persistence of friendship networks in the region, the lack of trust 
towards others outside of those networks, the legacy of distrust towards commu-
nist organisations, and disappointment with post-communist politics [Howard 
2002, 2003]. Howard’s results also complement a large literature on the problems 
of democracy building in post-communist countries, particularly the problems 
of citizen apathy and disillusionment [e.g. Smolar 1996; Greskovits 1998; Ekiert 
and Kubik 2001; Mihaylova 2004]. While those results are now the common wis-
dom about post-communist politics, we should question – two decades since 1989 
– whether and how the communist legacy continues to exert a strong inﬂ uence on 
non-electoral political participation.
Many analyses of non-electoral political participation in Central Europe 
seem to focus on how much people participate, such as how many civic associa-
tions people are members of, growth in the size of civil society, and what po-
litical capacities those civic associations have [Frič 2004; Rakušanová 2005, 2008; 
Vajdová 2005]. While those are important issues, civic participation needs to be 
clearly differentiated from political participation, and that not all people engage 
in political action via organised interest groups. Further, the issue of how much 
people participate in civic or political action should not blind us from the equally 
important issue of who participates and what kinds of socio-demographic charac-
teristics those people have. Insofar as systems of social stratiﬁ cation differentiate 
people’s social status into higher and lower, status differences in political partici-
pation can also be understood as inequalities of participation. 
The inequality of political participation should be seen as a fundamental 
problem of any democratic political system. One of the major tenets of demo-
cratic equality among contemporary political theorists is that everyone whose 
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interests are affected by political decisions should be included in the process 
of making them [Young 2000; Shapiro 2001; Fraser 2003]. Even in countries that 
guarantee political equality through complex systems of political and civil rights, 
the effective ability of all citizens to make use of those rights can vary. If the ef-
fective use of opportunities for political participation is socially stratiﬁ ed, and if 
that stratiﬁ cation is widespread and exhibits patterns of regularity, then we can 
say that there is inequality in political participation in that situation [Schlozman, 
Verba and Brady 1995, 1999]. Such inequalities can emerge from differences in 
the economic resources needed to cover the opportunity costs of participation 
[Parry, Moyser and Day 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003], due to differences 
in information and knowledge between different groups and due to the broader 
problems of inequality and exclusion in the society at large.
It might seem intuitive to expect that inequalities in political participation 
would be lower in post-communist countries compared to Western Europe, due 
to the breadth of democratic opposition movements the region has witnessed and 
due to the egalitarian legacy of the past communist regimes. However, this article 
anticipates that that intuition is wrong. Political participation is also inﬂ uenced 
by the openness of the political system, the perceived efﬁ cacy of participation 
and possibilities for political change. The article thus hypothesises that inequali-
ties in political participation are likely to be higher in post-communist countries, 
as respondents of lower status are more likely to see the political system as closed 
and unresponsive to the concerns of ordinary people.
In a broader light, this article contributes to the emerging literature on the 
determinants of political participation at the individual level [Mutz 2006; Gallego 
2007; Caínzos, Ferrin and Voces 2007]. If social stratiﬁ cation factors like income 
ad education shape inequalities in voter turnout, do those factors shape, to the 
same degree, inequalities in other political actions? Are factors like social trust 
and networks associated with some forms of political participation more than 
others – and do such associations differ between countries? Above all, what dif-
ferences are there in the determinants of political participation between Western 
and post-communist countries, and what do they tell us about political inequal-
ity? This article takes a step forward in assessing the role of social stratiﬁ cation, 
the post-communist context, and other factors on different forms of political par-
ticipation across 23 West, Central, and East European countries, by making use of 
the second wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2004–2005.1
The article is organised as follows. The following section reviews the inter-
national literature on the determinants of political participation. The subsequent 
1 Only 23 of the 25 ESS countries are included in the analysis below. Since the article 
focuses on the comparison of political participation between Western European and post-
communist countries, Turkey is excluded, as it does not easily ﬁ t into that comparative 
framework. In addition, the French ESS questionnaire excluded a question that is part of a 
composite measure of social networks, and thus the French data are also excluded. 
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section then outlines the hypotheses to be tested in the analysis, as well as the 
data and methods used. The presentation and interpretation of the analysis is 
then followed by a set of concluding reﬂ ections about differences in inequalities 
of political participation between the two sets of countries examined.
Who participates? A brief overview of the literature
Since the publication of Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action in 1965, po-
litical scientists have tended to view organised civic and political participation 
as problems of collective action. Citizens can ‘free ride’ by receiving the beneﬁ ts 
of strong civic organisations and political institutions, while not contributing the 
time and resources needed to realise those beneﬁ ts. For example, workers may 
beneﬁ t from the services that trade unions can offer (wage bargaining, the de-
fence of workers’ interests) but may be not willing to ﬁ nancially support unions, 
particularly if they think that their contribution will have a negligible impact on 
what the union does. To solve the free rider problem, Olson observed that unions 
provide a number of ‘non-collective incentives’ (membership-based beneﬁ ts) to 
entice workers to join; alternatively, they can also force workers to join by having 
government require that workers become members.
The free rider problem can also be applied to forms of political participa-
tion like voter turnout. If citizens believe that voting is costly (e.g. in terms of 
time and energy) and that their decision to vote would have a negligible impact 
on the electoral outcome, we would expect that voter turnout would be much 
lower than it actually is. Aldrich [1993] thus posed the question of whether ra-
tional choice theories can explain who and why people vote in the numbers that 
they do. A core premise of such theories is that the expected utility of voting for 
individual voters must be higher than the aggregate costs of turnout. Different 
voters in different contexts or life situations will have different expected utilities, 
and thus different turnout rates. While not rejecting the rational choice approach, 
Aldrich argued that turnout can be high because the beneﬁ ts and costs of voting 
for many citizens are very small. In terms of stratiﬁ cation, poorer and lower-sta-
tus voters might have higher opportunity costs of voting than voters with higher 
income and status. In sum, the decision to participate in an election can be due to 
very small variations in beneﬁ ts and costs, such as the time and costs of travelling 
to the poll, or whether or not there is bad weather on Election Day. Those argu-
ments have spurred a large literature on the role of institutional and legal condi-
tions that can signiﬁ cantly impact the calculus of voting.
Opposed to the rational choice approach, social status-based explanations 
of participation focus on the role of stratiﬁ cation variables like income and oc-
cupation in shaping people’s decision to vote. In Who Votes? [1980], Wolﬁ nger 
and Rosenstone found that, within their model, receiving a high school diploma 
leads to a roughly 22% increase in the probability of voting across income groups, 
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whereas going to college also increases turnout, but more so for people of lower 
income. In terms of the effect of age, they challenged the view that age has a strong 
non-linear effect on voting (i.e. increasing with age, but then declining as voters 
become very old), observing instead that the lower turnout rates among the very 
old are not due to age per se, but due to differences in education, marital status, 
and sex. Earlier studies by Glenn and Grimes [1968] and Verba and Nie [1972] 
also identiﬁ ed interaction effects between age and other demographic variables. 
While these studies are relatively old, they set the groundwork for the kinds of 
social and demographic variables to be tested in explanations of turnout.
While sociological studies often focus on the statistical signiﬁ cance of in-
dividual demographic factors, Matsusaka and Palda [1999] contended that the 
focus of the analysis should rather be placed on the overall explanatory power of 
such models. Using survey and aggregate data for four Canadian national elec-
tions from 1979 to 1988, they found that a long list of demographic variables (age, 
income, education, gender, community size, occupational status, etc.) can explain 
no more than 15% of the variation in turnout. In other words, ‘although indi-
viduals with certain demographic characteristics have higher propensities to vote 
(more educated and older people, for example), and contextual factors such as 
campaign expenditures have signiﬁ cant positive effects on an individual’s likeli-
hood of voting, the overall ability of these variables to organize the data is weak’ 
[ibid: 432]. Since most of the variation in turnout cannot be explained, i.e. turn-
out is more or less random in nature, they conclude that the inability to explain 
turnout supports rational choice theory. According to Aldrich, voting behaviour 
hinges on relatively small factors like trafﬁ c conditions on Election Day; since 
such factors are basically immeasurable, turnout at the individual level should 
appear unpredictable and variable, which is precisely what Matsusaka and Palda 
observed.
Research on non-electoral political participation often differentiates such 
behaviour into two types: conventional political action and protest activity. Con-
ventional action involves attending meetings, working for political organisations, 
joining political parties, contacting ofﬁ cials, etc. Besides demographic character-
istics, scholars have (not surprisingly) found that citizens’ interest in politics is 
a key determinant of whether or not they would be willing to participate in po-
litical action. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady’s critique of rational choice theories 
of participation was based on the claim that activists do not participate out of 
material beneﬁ ts, but because of the feeling of civic duty, ‘civic motivations and 
a desire to inﬂ uence policy’ [Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1995: 32]. Similarly, 
citizens who believe that government is responsive to citizens’ needs are thought 
to be more willing to participate compared to others [Teixeira 1992; Rosenstone 
and Hansen 2003]. 
Scholars have also claimed that social characteristics inﬂ uence probabilities 
of participation as well. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady [1995] contended that ex-
planations of political participation need to go beyond analysis of social status to 
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examine the role of civic capacities and skills, such that citizens who are better 
at organising or speaking would be more likely to participate in certain forms of 
political action. Research on social capital has found that social connections, such 
as the size of friendship networks, would lead to more participation in political 
life [Almond and Verba 1963]. Similarly, Bădescu, Sum, and Uslaner [2004] found 
that social trust contributes to the chances that citizens – in the case of Romania 
and Moldova – would become politically active in their communities.
By contrast, some scholars claim that citizens who participate in protest 
activities are thought to have different stratiﬁ cation and attitudinal characteris-
tics than those who participate in conventional actions. Most of the research on 
protest activities has come from the social movement literature. For example, it 
can be contended that people who protest are those who have become dissatis-
ﬁ ed with political and economic conditions or the way government has handled 
speciﬁ c issues [McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996]. Protesters also differ in their 
value systems and are more likely to hold post-materialist values, such as demon-
strating in order to protect encroachments on the freedom of the press [Inglehart 
1990; Bean 1991]. Generational factors may also play a role, as young people may 
be more likely to protest than older citizens [Bean 1991; Dalton 2002]. 
Against the stratiﬁ cation approach, Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst [2005] 
argue that protesting is simply one form of participation among others, i.e. that 
the form of participation citizens choose is based on strategic decisions of efﬁ cacy 
and not based on the ‘type’ of person the protester is. As a result, those scholars 
predict that there should be a great deal of similarity between people who engage 
in conventional and protest activity, such as in their political interests, attitudes, 
and political orientations. 
From the literature above, it is clear that an analysis of inequalities in politi-
cal participation cannot simply focus on conditions like education and income in 
shaping participation. Rather, such factors need to be supplemented with control 
variables on social trust, social networks, satisfaction with politics, and so on. 
While the inclusion of such control variables will likely weaken the effects of 
the stratiﬁ cation variables, they at the same time provide a clearer picture of the 
kinds of conditions that determine the chances of engaging in different forms of 
political action.
Data, hypotheses, and methods
The data for our analysis of the determinants of political participation come from 
the second round of the ESS, conducted in 2004 and 2005. Compared to other so-
cial surveys, the ESS is relatively theory-driven and is designed to create data that 
can explain the interaction between institutions, beliefs, and behaviour across the 
European continent. The third round of the survey was conducted in 2006–2007, 
but the ﬁ nal international data ﬁ le was not yet completed in time for this analysis. 
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ESS is an ideal survey to use because it contains a core module focused on social 
variables like media use, social trust, political interest, political participation, po-
litical orientations, social values, and demographic and stratiﬁ cation background 
variables.2 The variables for political participation are all binary YES/NO ques-
tions, and thus binary logistic regression was used as the main method of analy-
sis. The dependent variables include:
 •  VOTE: Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]? 
(‘national’ refers to the primary legislative body; in the Czech case this is the 
June 2002 elections to the House of Deputies). Response: Yes = 1, No = 0.
The non-electoral forms of participation are measured by asking ‘During the last 
12 months, have you…’
 • CONTACT: ‘…contacted a politician, government or local government of-
ﬁ cial?’
 •WRKPP: ‘…worked in a political party or action group?’
 •WRKORG: ‘…worked in another organisation or association?’
 •BADGE: ‘…worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?’
 •PETITION: ‘…signed a petition?’
 •PROTEST: ‘…taken part in a lawful public demonstration?’
 •BOYCOTT: ‘…boycotted certain products?’
All of the variables have be recoded so that a Yes response = 1, and a No re-
sponse = 0.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for these variables in terms of the valid 
percent of respondents in each country who indicated that they participated in 
the given form of political action. Participation rates are clearly lower in post-
communist countries compared to Western Europe, but there are large differ-
ences in the forms of participation. In total, 17% of Czech respondents claimed 
to have contacted a politician or government ofﬁ cial in the last year, which is 
comparable to the level in many Western countries. Petition use in Slovakia is 
also quite high and comparable to advanced democracies. While Ukrainians par-
ticipate relatively little, their reported engagement in public demonstrations is 
among the highest in Europe (arguably due to the political situation of the coun-
try at that time). This suggests the importance of not making blanket statements 
about the incidence of political participation in post-communist countries; rather, 
we should observe and understand how and why different types of participation 
become actively used. 
2 The survey data, documentation, and questionnaires are all freely available on the ESS 
website at www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
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One limitation in the data in Table 1 could be that self-reported turnout rates 
for the country samples can differ from the ofﬁ cial turnout rates in the respective 
national elections. That would occur if the sample were not representative of the 
voting population at large, or if respondents did not accurately report or remem-
ber their voting behaviour. In 2002, turnout to the Czech parliamentary elections 
was 58%, quite close to the 56% self-reported in the survey. For Hungary, turnout 
in the ﬁ rst round of the parliamentary elections was 74%, again close to the self-
reported rate of 78%. For Slovakia, the actual turnout in the 2002 elections was 
70%, compared to the self-reported rate of 74%. By contrast, Poland’s 2001 Sejm 
elections had a turnout rate of 46%, which is quite far from the self-reported rate 
of 65%.
Differences between countries in the representativeness of self-reported 
voting to ofﬁ cial turnout statistics could cause problems in the possibility of bi-
ased regression coefﬁ cients. The vote validation study by Bernstein and his as-
sociates [Bernstein, Chadha and Montjoy 2001: 24] found that ‘people who are 
under the most pressure to vote are the ones most likely to misrepresent their be-
haviour when they fail to do so’. This means, according to one of the most recent 
vote validation studies in the United States, that ‘education is the most consistent 
predictor of over-reporting… over-reporters also tend to be more partisan, older, 
more likely to claim that they were contacted by a political party, more likely to 
be regular church attendees, and… people who feel that it is a civic duty to vote’ 
[Ansolabehere and Hersh 2008: 11]. Fortunately, there is also evidence from vote 
validation studies that false responses to self-reported voting are not likely to 
have a material impact on survey research using such data [Sigelman 1982; An-
derson and Silver 1986]. Since there is no way to validate whether respondents 
correctly report their participation in other forms of political action, such survey 
data have to be taken at face value.
To describe the overall degree of non-electoral participation in different 
countries, the seven variables above were summarised for each respondent, i.e. 
adding the number of types of participation each respondent has done in the 
previous year. It was then possible to measure the average participation rates by 
country, which are depicted in Figure 1. It should be emphasised that the graph 
does not depict the total number of participatory acts respondents have done, 
only the average number of types of participatory action. As would be expected, 
respondents in post-communist countries participate in the fewest forms of po-
litical participation, with the average Hungarian or the average Pole engaging in 
only .24 and .36 forms of participation, respectively. By contrast, Scandinavians 
employ the largest set of political actions, with the average Icelander claiming to 
have done over two different forms of participation in the previous year.
As discussed in the previous section, analyses of political participation often 
categorise such actions into conventional and protest forms [e.g. Badescu, Sum 
and Uslaner 2004]. The problem, however, is that different kinds of actions count 
as conventional or protest in different countries and contexts [Smith 2009]. In addi-
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tion, the determinants of different forms of participation can vary greatly, as Urban 
and Zvěřinová [2009] observed in the case of environmental political behaviour. 
For such reasons, we will analyse each form of political participation separately, 
i.e. without regard to whether it is seen as a conventional or protest activity.
Independent variables used to test the inequality of political participation 
were selected directly from the theoretical and empirical literature in the previ-
ous section. The selection of variables also draws directly from the author’s recent 
research on educational and social stratiﬁ cation [Matějů et al. 2007; Matějů and 
Smith 2008; Veselý and Smith 2008]. First, to test the hypothesis that respondents 
of higher social status are more likely to participate in many forms of political 
action, I used two variables, EDUYRS, a measure of years of education, and the 
International Socio-economic Index (ISEI), which is a standard measure of the 
occupational status of respondents. These variables provide a simpler and clearer 
picture of the effects of education and occupation than variables based on edu-
cational and class categories; further, the variable on educational categories also 
was not used due to a larger degree of non-response and deviation in the coding 
of data. A variable on family income also was not used due to the large degree of 
non-response. Lastly, to test for the degree of gender inequality, the dummy vari-
able FEMALE (female = 1, male = 0) was used in the analysis.
Figure 1. Mean participation rates by country, excluding voter turnout
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Second, to control and measure the effects of other socio-demographic con-
ditions, the following variables were used:
  AGE and AGE2: age of the respondent, and to capture non-linear effects, 
age squared divided by 100. 
  RELIG is a variable indicating the respondents’ self-reported degree of re-
ligiosity, as religion is often regarded as a strong predictor of political activ-
ity. Religiosity is measured through responses to the question: ‘Regardless 
of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you 
say you are?’ with responses ranging on a 12-point scale from 0 = not at all 
religious, to 11 = very religious. 
  CITY and VILLAGE are dummy variables relating to whether the respond-
ent reports that he or she lives in a large city (1 = yes, 0 = no) or in a village 
or farm (1 = yes, 0 = no). The reference category for these variables is the 
category of respondents living in towns and suburban areas.
  UNION is a dummy variable for whether the respondent is currently a 
member of a trade union = 1, if not = 0.
  STUDENT is a dummy variable for whether the respondent’s main activity 
for the week prior to the interview was studying = 1, if not = 0.
Third, to test the hypothesis that citizens in post-communist countries are 
less likely to participate in non-electoral forms of action than citizens without a 
communist past, a dummy variable POSTCOM was created indicating a post-
communist country = 1, if not 0. The German data were split so that respondents 
in the former GDR were coded as post-communist. To account for national level 
effects, dummy variables were created for each country.
Fourth, to test the hypothesis that social trust is a strong determinant of 
political participation, I used principle components analysis (PCA) to construct a 
latent variable TRUST based on three standard questions:
  ‘Would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?’ (Scale of 0 through 10; 0 = you can’t be too 
careful, 10 = most people can be trusted).
  ‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they 
got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’ (Scale of 0 through 10; 0 = most 
people would try to take advantage of me, 10 = most people would try to be 
fair).
  ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they 
are mostly looking out for themselves?’ (Scale of 0 through 10; 0 = people 
mostly look out for themselves, 10 = people mostly try to be helpful).
These questions work well across countries, and have factor weights of .84, .84, 
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and .80 respectively for the latent variable TRUST, which in turn explains 68% of 
the variance in the underlying three variables.
Fifth, to test the hypothesis that people who are more interested in politics 
are more likely to participate, I also used PCA to create a latent variable INTPOL 
comprised of three standard questions on political interest:
  ‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’ with responses ranging 
from 1 = not at all interested, to 4 = very interested.
  ‘How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really under-
stand what is going on?’ with responses ranging from frequently (1), regu-
larly, occasionally, seldom and never (5).
  ‘How difﬁ cult or easy do you ﬁ nd it to make your mind up about politi-
cal issues?’ with responses ranging from very difﬁ cult (1), difﬁ cult, neither 
easy nor difﬁ cult, easy, and very easy (5).
The ﬁ rst two questions were recoded so that higher values indicate higher 
levels of interest and understanding. It should also be mentioned that these ques-
tions and the social trust questions were asked prior to the political participation 
questions in the survey, which avoids the bias that respondents’ political activi-
ties would impact how they report their political interests, which some studies 
have found can lead to biased responses [Bishop, Oldendick and Tuchfarber 1984; 
Abramson, Silver and Anderson 1987]. The questions work well across countries 
and have factor weights of .74, .80, and .80 respectively, creating a latent variable 
INTPOL that explains 61% of the variance of the underlying three variables.
Sixth, to test the hypothesis that respondents with larger social networks 
are more likely to participate, I created a relatively unique composite variable 
SOCNET that incorporates questions on socialising with a question on personal 
Internet use, since the latter is an important way many people maintain their 
friendship networks:
  ‘How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?’ 
with responses ranging from never (=1), less than a month, once a month, 
several times a month, once a week, several times a week, and every day 
(=7).
  ‘Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take 
part in social activities?’ with responses ranging from much less than most 
(=1), less than most, about the same, more than most, and much more than 
most (=5).
  ‘How often do you use the internet, the World Wide Web or e-mail – wheth-
er at home or at work – for your personal use?’ with responses ranging from 
1 to 7 on a similar scale as the ﬁ rst question.
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The Internet question worked with the other questions better than any other vari-
able I was able to identify. Overall, the three questions have factor weights of 
.77, .74, and .62, respectively, creating a latent variable SOCNET that explains 
51% of the variance in the underlying three variables. The French survey omit-
ted the question on Internet use, and thus the entire French dataset was omitted 
from the ﬁ nal analysis. This, however, does not have a material impact on the re-
sults.
Lastly, it was important to test whether satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
politics has different effects across forms of participation. Since political partici-
pation could spring from one’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment, the economic situation, or problems with the quality of democratic de-
cision-making, a composite variable SATPOL was constructed based on three 
similar questions:
  ‘On the whole how satisﬁ ed are you with the present state of the economy 
in [country]?’ with responses based on an 11-point scale from extremely 
dissatisﬁ ed =0, to extremely satisﬁ ed = 10.
  ‘Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisﬁ ed are you with 
the way it is doing its job?’ with responses based on the same 11-point 
scale.
  ‘And on the whole, how satisﬁ ed are you with the way democracy works in 
[country]?’ with responses based on the same 11-point scale.
      
These questions work very well together with factor scores of .85, .88, and .84, 
respectively, creating a latent variable SATIS that explains a large 73% of the vari-
ance in the underlying three variables.
Results of the analysis
One of the primary goals of the analysis is to compare differences in the determi-
nants of political participation between Western and post-communist countries 
in the ESS ﬁ le. This was achieved through four separate logistic regression analy-
ses. The ﬁ rst regression incorporated the data for all countries and included the 
POSTCOM variable to measure the direct effect of post-communism. In the sec-
ond and third regressions, the ESS ﬁ le was split so that two separate regressions 
could be run on Western and post-communist countries, respectively. Lastly, the 
fourth regression tested for the statistical signiﬁ cance of the differences in coef-
ﬁ cients between the two sets of countries, as reported in the second and third 
regressions. As a whole, the four sets of regressions for each of the forms of politi-
cal participation provide a comprehensive picture and direct comparison of the 
determinants of participation across Europe. 
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Since the signiﬁ cance test is the most important aspect of the analysis, 
the reasoning behind the approach should be brieﬂ y outlined.3 As an example, 
let’s say we want to compare the regression coefﬁ cients of years of education 
(EDUYRS) between Western and post-communist countries by testing the null 
hypothesis that EDUYRSPOSTCOM = EDUYRSWEST. To do this, we create a dummy 
variable (POSTCOM) that is coded 1 for a post-communist country and 0 for a 
Western one, and an interaction effect EDUYRS*POSTCOM to be included in the 
regression equation. Our model includes a constant A. Also, let’s say we want 
to compare the effects of 11 years of schooling between the two sets of coun-
tries. In this example, the predicted value for the Western countries would be: 
f(West) = f(A + 0*POSTCOM + 11*EDUYRS + 11*0*EDUYRS*POSTCOM). Since 
the value of POSTCOM is 0 for Western countries, the value of the interaction 
effect also is 0. As a result, f(West) = f(A + 11*EDUYRS), or in other words, the 
coefﬁ cient for EDUYRS in the regression model with interaction effects is the 
slope of education for Western countries only (i.e. it is the same as the coefﬁ cient 
for Western countries in the second regression).
Similarly, the predicted value of f(East) at 11 years of schooling = f(A + 1*POST-
COM + 11*EDUYRS + 11*1*EDUYRS*POSTCOM). In this case, the slope for edu-
cation in post-communist countries is f(11*EDUYRS + 11*1*EDUYRS*POSTCOM). 
This is why, if we look at Tables 2a–h, the coefﬁ cients in the regressions with 
interaction effects (BE – BW) are equivalent to the coefﬁ cients for EAST minus the 
coefﬁ cients for WEST. In a similar vein, the p-value of the interaction effect indicates 
the statistical signiﬁ cance to which the coefﬁ cient of education differs between the two 
sets of countries. 
Following this reasoning, interaction effects between POSTCOM and all of 
the individual-level variables were used as a way to directly compare the deter-
minants of political participation between the two sets of countries. This creates 
a very large regression table, since the regression includes both the two-way in-
teractions and their main effects. But since the coefﬁ cients for the main effects 
are equivalent to the coefﬁ cients in the WEST regression, they are not included 
in Tables 2a–h. The country dummy variables are also not reported due to space 
constraints and the limited information of interest that they provide.4 
Many of the coefﬁ cients go in the direction that one would expect from 
the empirical literature [Caínzos, Ferrin and Voces 2007], yet there are also some 
surprising results. Looking at the regressions for all countries (the ALL columns), 
the coefﬁ cients for POSTCOM are not particularly strong, and are even insig-
3 Readers interested in how to perform tests of signiﬁ cance in SPSS regressions can con-
sult the very useful website of the UCLA Academic Technology Services (http://www.ats.
ucla.edu/stat/spss/default.htm). Jaccard [2001] also provides a theoretical analysis of the 
issues involved in interpreting interaction effects in logistic regressions.
4 The full results of the analysis (including, e.g., the country dummy coefﬁ cients, stand-
ardised coefﬁ cients, etc.) are available upon request by contacting the author.
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Table 2a.  Determinants of VOTE across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, standard 
errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies and the ﬁ xed 
effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                          VOTE
ALL West East BE – BW
ISEI .010***(.001)
.008***
(.001)
.013***
(.002)
.005*
(.003)
EDU .032***(.006)
.027***
(.007)
.050***
(.012)
.023
(.014)
FEMALE .172***(.033)
.197***
(.042)
.124*
(.054)
–.073
(.068)
AGE .089***(.006)
.097***
(.007)
.074***
(.010)
–.023
(.012)
AGE2 –.059***(.006)
–.064***
(.007)
–.048***
(.010)
.016
(.012)
INTPOL .460***(.019)
.513***
(.024)
.365***
(.031)
–.148***
(.039)
TRUST .130***(.019)
.130***
(.025)
.125***
(.030)
–.005
(.039)
SOCNET .187***(.019)
.215***
(.025)
.145***
(.031)
–.070
(.040)
SATISPOL .209***(.020)
.198***
(.025)
.219***
(.032)
.021
(.040)
CITY –.198**(.044)
–.178**
(.057)
–.234**
(.070)
–.056
(.090)
VILLAGE .217***(.036)
.208***
(.046)
.237***
(.060)
.029
(.076)
RELIG .042***(.006)
.052***
(.008)
.024*
(.010)
–.028*
(.012)
UNION .384***(.044)
.424***
(.051)
.279**
(.087)
–.145
(.101)
STUDENT –.225**(.084)
–.173
(.097)
–.333
(.170)
–.160
(.196)
POSTCOM –.439***(.114)
–.100
(.346)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –2.079***(.170)
–2.232***
(.205)
–2.331***
(.279)
–2.232***
(.205)
Nagelkerke R–square .227 .223 .192 .229
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (Sig.) .015 .018 .355 .001
N. cases 30693 21817 8876 30693
*** indicates p < 0.001, ** indicates p <0.01, and * indicates p <0.05.
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Table 2b.  Determinants of CONTACT across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies and 
the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                           CONTACT
All West East BE – BW
ISEI .005***(.001)
.003*
(.001)
.009***
(.003)
.006*
(.003)
EDU .035***(.005)
.028***
(.006)
.077***
(.014)
.049**
(.015)
FEMALE –.140***(.033)
–.142***
(.038)
–.157*
(.069)
–.016
(.079)
AGE .081***(.007)
.092***
(.008)
.045**
(.013)
–.047**
(.015)
AGE2 –.074***(.006)
–.085***
(.007)
–.038**
(.013)
.048**
(.015)
INTPOL .432***(.019)
.480***
(.022)
.269***
(.040)
–.211***
(.046)
TRUST –.068**(.020)
–.083***
(.023)
–.028
(.039)
.055
(.045)
SOCNET .356***(.020)
.367***
(.023)
.324***
(.039)
–.043
(.046)
SATISPOL –.054**(.020)
–.076**
(.023)
–.004
(.039)
.072
(.045)
CITY –.254***(.047)
–.238***
(.055)
–.318**
(.092)
–.081
(.107)
VILLAGE .302***(.036)
.298***
(.041)
.327***
(.075)
.029
(.086)
RELIG .042***(.006)
.047***
(.007)
.031***
(.012)
–.016
(.014)
UNION .182***(.038)
.207***
(.042)
.035
(.097)
–.172
(.106)
STUDENT –.041(.094)
–.010
(.103)
–.157
(.230)
–.147
(.252)
POSTCOM .109(.117)
.440
(.423)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –4.937***(.181)
–5.047***
(.205)
–4.608***
(.370)
–5.047***
(.205)
Nagelkerke R–square .136 .143 .100 .139
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (Sig.) .003 .009 .929 .191
N. cases 32278 23112 9156 32278
*** indicates p < 0.001, ** indicates p <0.01, and * indicates p <0.05.
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Table 2c.  Determinants of WRKPP. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, standard errors, 
and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies and the ﬁ xed effects 
for BE – BW are not shown.
                                          WRKPP
ALL West East BE – BW
ISEI .003(.002)
.002
(.002)
.006
(.004)
.004
(.005)
EDU .000(.009)
–.008
(.009)
.060*
(.024)
(.068)**
(.025)
FEMALE –.189**(.057)
–.150*
(.063)
–.357**
(.129)
–.208
(.144)
AGE .066***(.011)
.069***
(.012)
.048
(.025)
–.022
(.028)
AGE2 –.051***(.011)
–.054***
(.012)
–.036
(.024)
.019
(.027)
INTPOL .821***(.034)
.835***
(.038)
.757***
(.077)
–.078
(.086)
TRUST .016(.033)
–.013
(.038)
.024
(.071)
.010
(.080)
SOCNET .489***(.035)
.503***
(.040)
.448***
(.072)
–.056
(.083)
SATISPOL –.050(.033)
–.060
(.037)
–.016
(.069)
.045
(.078)
CITY –.098(.076)
.006
(.086)
–.489**
(.168)
–.495**
(.188)
VILLAGE .255***(.062)
.303***
(.069)
.081
(.139)
–.223
(.155)
RELIG .034**(.010)
.037**
(.011)
.023
(.022)
–.014
(.025)
UNION .377***(.063)
.413***
(.068)
.211
(.165)
–.202
(.178)
STUDENT .546***(.142)
.572***
(.155)
.441
(.349)
–.131
(.382)
POSTCOM .600**(.192)
.424
(.755)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –6.348***(.310)
–6.376***
(.344)
–5.952***
(.672)
–6.376***
(.344)
Nagelkerke R–square .169 .173 .137 .171
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (Sig.) .456
.115 .851 .496
N. cases 32275 23118 9157 32275
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
Michael L. Smith: The Inequality of Participation
505
Table 2d.  Determinants of WRKORG across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies 
and the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                          WRKORG
All West East BE – BW
ISEI .009***(.001)
.007***
(.001)
.018***
(.003)
.010**
(.004)
EDU .031***(.006)
.027***
(.006)
.069***
(.018)
.042*
(.019)
FEMALE –.268***(.035)
–.241***
(.038)
–.481***
(.095)
–.240*
(.103)
AGE .040***(.007)
.042***
(.007)
.027
(.018)
–.015
(.019)
AGE2 –.026***(.006)
–.029**
(.007)
–.013
(.017)
.015
(.018)
INTPOL .339***(.021)
.360***
(.022)
.218***
(.056)
–.142*
(.060)
TRUST .058**(.022)
.083***
(.024)
–.079
(.054)
–.161**
(.059)
SOCNET .593***(.022)
.611***
(.025)
.503***
(.055)
–.108
(.060)
SATISPOL –.066**(.021)
–.072**
(.023)
–.021
(.053)
.051
(.058)
CITY –.207***(.050)
–.265***
(.055)
.014
(.116)
.278*
(.128)
VILLAGE .289***(.038)
.314***
(.041)
.121
(.107)
–.193
(.115)
RELIG .055***(.006)
.060***
(.007)
.031
(.016)
–.029
(.018)
UNION .363***(.039)
.317***
(.041)
.732***
(.119)
.414**
(.126)
STUDENT .356***(.085)
.306**
(.090)
.696**
(.243)
.390
(.259)
POSTCOM .324**(.104)
.390
(.516)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –4.051***(.180)
–3.990***
(.193)
–4.179***
(.479)
–3.990***
(.193)
Nagelkerke R–square .245 .218 .205 .249
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (Sig.) .215 .162 .803 .053
N. cases 32242 23099 9143 32242
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
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Table 2e.  Determinants of BADGE across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies 
and the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                          BADGE
ALL West East   BE – BW
ISEI .001(.002)
.000
(.002)
.009*
(.004)
.009*
(.004)
EDU –.002(.007)
–.006
(.008)
.033
(.022)
.038
(.023)
FEMALE .233***(.045)
.298***
(.050)
–.117
(.108)
–.416***
(.119)
AGE –.001(.008)
.000
(.009)
.009
(.021)
.009
(.023)
AGE2 –.005(.008)
–.003
(.009)
–.023
(.021)
–.021
(.023)
INTPOL .445***(.026)
.458***
(.029)
.369***
(.065)
–.089
(.071)
TRUST .042(.027)
.042
(.031)
.040
(.059)
–.002
(.067)
SOCNET .363***(.028)
.399***
(.032)
.236***
(.062)
–.164*
(.069)
SATISPOL –.067*(.027)
–.123***
(.030)
.156**
(.058)
.279***
(.066)
CITY .088(.059)
.113
(.066)
–.049
(.132)
–.161
(.148)
VILLAGE .025(.050)
.015
(.055)
.062
(.123)
.046
(.134)
RELIG .030***(.008)
.031***
(.009)
.024
(.020)
–.008
(.021)
UNION .372***(.050)
.385***
(.054)
.302*
(.136)
–.082
(.147)
STUDENT .558***(.093)
.525***
(.101)
.892***
(.234)
.367
(.255)
POSTCOM –.361(.215)
–.838
(.605)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –3.503***(.223)
–3.485***
(.242)
–4.322***
(.555)
–3.485
(.242)
Nagelkerke R–square .155 .149 .140 .159
Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test (Sig.) .721 .189 .721 .867
N. cases 32233 23092 9141 32233
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
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Table 2f.  Determinants of PETITION across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies and 
the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                         PETITION
All West East BE – BW
ISEI .004***(.001)
.004**
(.001)
.004
(.003)
.000
(.003)
EDU .048***(.005)
.046***
(.005)
.062***
(.014)
.017
(.015)
FEMALE .254***(.030)
.276***
(.033)
.134
(.069)
–.142
(.077)
AGE .030***(.006)
.031***
(.006)
.021
(.013)
–.010
(.015)
AGE2 –.039***(.006)
–.039***
(.006)
–.031*
(.013)
.008
(.015)
INTPOL .267***(.017)
.244***
(.019)
.383***
(.041)
.139**
(.046)
TRUST .033(.018)
.027
(.020)
.050
(.039)
.023
(.044)
SOCNET .269***(.018)
.288***
(.020)
.197***
(.039)
–.091*
(.044)
SATISPOL –.201***(.018)
–.214***
(.020)
–.137**
(.039)
.078
(.044)
CITY –.010(.041)
.018
(.046)
–.144
(.086)
–.162
(.098)
VILLAGE –.054(.033)
.004
(.036)
–.328***
(.079)
–.332***
(.087)
RELIG .024***(.005)
.022***
(.006)
.033**
(.012)
.011
(.014)
UNION .260***(.034)
.231***
(.037)
.497***
(.092)
.265**
(.099)
STUDENT .344***(.070)
.351***
(.076)
.289
(.184)
–.062
(.199)
POSTCOM .227*(.089)
.345
(.385)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –2.491***(.149)
–2.499***
(.163)
–2.153***
(.184)
–2.499***
(.163)
Nagelkerke R–square .228 .201 .194 .231
Hosmer and Leme-
show test (Sig.) .003 .010 .087 .006
N. cases 32164 23044 9120 32164
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
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Table 2g.  Determinants of PROTEST across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies and 
the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                         PROTEST
ALL West East BE  – BW
ISEI –.003(.002)
–.004*
(.002)
.003
(.004)
.007
(.004)
EDU .038***(.008)
.036***
(.008)
.034
(.021)
–.001
(.022)
FEMALE .141**(.048)
.239***
(.055)
–.231*
(.102)
–.469***
(.116)
AGE .000(.009)
.000
(.010)
.009
(.019)
.009
(.022)
AGE2 –.013(.009)
–.011
(.011)
–.022
(.020)
–.011
(.022)
INTPOL .404***(.028)
.401***
(.031)
.405***
(.061)
.004
(.069)
TRUST .038(.028)
.072*
(.033)
–.043
(.055)
–.115
(.065)
SOCNET .304***(.030)
.389***
(.035)
.088
(.057)
–.301***
(.067)
SATISPOL –.195***(.028)
–.262***
(.033)
–.013
(.054)
.249***
(.064)
CITY .334***(.059)
.330***
(.068)
.349**
(.118)
.018
(.137)
VILLAGE –.194***(.056)
–.209**
(.063)
–.187
(.122)
.021
(.137)
RELIG –.018*(.009)
–.032**
(.010)
.039
(.018)
.071**
(.021)
UNION .528***(.054)
.519***
(.061)
.563***
(.120)
–.044
(.135)
STUDENT .590***(.136)
.535***
(.109)
.857***
(.244)
.322
(.267)
POSTCOM .993***(.136)
.652
(.564)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –3.399***(.239)
–3.321***
(.267)
–2.669***
(.496)
–3.321***
(.267)
Nagelkerke R–square .209 .202 .239 .213
Hosmer and Leme-
show test (Sig.) .516 .134 .616 .220
N. cases 32252 23114 9138 32252
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
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Table 2h.  Determinants of BOYCOTT across Europe. Unstandardised coefﬁ cients, 
standard errors, and signiﬁ cance levels are reported. Country dummies 
and the ﬁ xed effects for BE – BW are not shown.
                                         BOYCOTT
All West East BE – BW
ISEI .004***(.001)
.004***
(.001)
.005
(.003)
.001
(.003)
EDU .068***(.006)
.069***
(.006)
.060**
(.018)
–.009
(.019)
FEMALE .289***(.034)
.334***
(.037)
.001
(.008)
–.333**
(.096)
AGE .044***(.006)
.047***
(.007)
.031
(.017)
–.016
(.018)
AGE2 –.046***(.006)
–.048***
(.007)
–.033
(.017)
.015
(.018)
INTPOL .398***(.020)
.391***
(.022)
.450***
(.053)
.059
(.057)
TRUST .019(.021)
.014
(.023)
.026
(.051)
.012
(.056)
SOCNET .184***(.021)
.179***
(.023)
.200***
(.050)
.021
(.055)
SATISPOL –.218***(.020)
–.232***
(.022)
–.122*
(.050)
.110*
(.055)
CITY .154**(.045)
.117*
(.050)
.264**
(.101)
.147
(.113)
VILLAGE –.140***(.038)
–.096*
(.041)
–.485***
(.111)
–.388**
(.118)
RELIG –.005(.006)
–.011
(.007)
.028
(.015)
.039*
(.017)
UNION .114**(.039)
.109**
(.041)
.171
(.126)
.062
(.132)
STUDENT .365***(.079)
.336***
(.084)
.656**
(.219)
.320
(.235)
POSTCOM –.686***(.106)
–.131
(.490)
Country dummies Not shown Not shown Not shown Not shown
Constant –3.425***(.173)
–3.482***
(.186)
–3.613***
(.453)
–3.482***
(.186)
Nagelkerke R–square .212 .189 .137 .214
Hosmer and Leme-
show test (Sig.) .108 .412 .542 .367
N. cases 32159 23052 9107 32159
*** indicates p<0.001, ** indicates p<0.01, and * indicates p<0.05.
Source (Tables 2a–2h): ESS Round 2, 2004–2005.
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niﬁ cant for contacting politicians and wearing badges. After controlling for the 
country-level dummy variables, the post-communist context decreases the chanc-
es of voting and boycotting, but surprisingly increases the chances of signing 
petitions, demonstrating, and to a lesser degree working in political parties and 
organisations. It should be noted that, once we allow for two-way interactions, all 
of the observed direct effects of post-communism are actually indirectly mediated 
by individual-level variables. As can be seen in the regression with interaction ef-
fects (BE – BW), POSTCOM is insigniﬁ cant for all forms of political participation.
Focusing on the role of social stratiﬁ cation, the effect of occupational status 
(ISEI) is the strongest on voting and working in organisations. The effects of oc-
cupational status are statistically stronger in post-communist countries in terms 
of voting, contacting politicians, wearing badges, and working in organisations. 
In no case are class inequalities in participation larger in the West than in the East. 
Even in the cases where the differences between the sets of countries are statisti-
cally insigniﬁ cant, the coefﬁ cients are usually larger in the post-communist set, 
though this could be entirely due to sampling error. 
Similarly, the coefﬁ cients for the role of education closely match that of oc-
cupational status, and generally show that more education increases the odds 
that respondents engage in more political participation. However, education 
clearly has stronger effects in the post-communist countries in terms of the con-
ventional political actions of contacting politicians and working in political par-
ties and other organisations. While each year of education achieved by respondents 
in post-communist countries increases their odds of contacting politicians by a 
factor of 1.08, this is only 1.03 for respondents in Western Europe. Overall, we can 
say that while it is well known that political participation is socially stratiﬁ ed, 
we have additionally found that conventional political actions are even more strati-
ﬁ ed by occupation and education in post-communist countries compared to the West. By 
contrast, there are relatively few differences in the effects of social stratiﬁ cation 
on voting and protest actions (i.e. petitions, demonstrations, and boycotting) be-
tween the two sets of countries.
One of the most interesting ﬁ ndings of the analysis concerns the role of 
gender (FEMALE). Across all countries, women are more likely than men to vote, 
wear political badges, demonstrate, sign petitions, and boycott products. By con-
trast, women are less likely than men to engage in the conventional actions of 
contacting politicians and working in political parties and organisations. This 
suggests a strong gendered dimension of political action, with men more likely 
to engage in the ‘ofﬁ cial’ or conventional forms of participation, whereas women 
have greater odds of engaging in grassroots actions that are generally located 
outside political institutions. Comparing gender inequality between East and 
West, women in post-communist countries are statistically less likely to work in 
organisations, demonstrate, boycott, and wear badges. In other words, in all of 
the regressions performed with statistically signiﬁ cant gender differences, the 
coefﬁ cients express that gender inequalities are larger in the East. For example, 
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the odds of participating in demonstrations in the West increases by a factor of 
1.27 by being female instead of male, but decreases by a factor of .79 for women 
in the East. Overall, it seems to be the case that women in both sets of countries 
face inequalities in participating in conventional political actions. While this is 
compensated somewhat in the West by women’s greater propensity for protest, 
this is not the case at all in the East, where women are no more likely than men to 
engage in any of the protest actions.
These ﬁ ndings generally reﬂ ect qualitative research conducted on gender 
politics in post-communist countries. In the Czech case, Havelková [1997, 1999] 
found that women are much less likely to get involved in politics at the national 
level (compared to the local level) due to deeply rooted gender stereotypes. Dif-
ferences in gendered political behaviour are not rooted in gender or sexual iden-
tity per se, but the way political environments are socially interpreted in terms 
of the ‘proper’ roles of men and women in those environments. Besides women’s 
greater propensity to vote, the data conﬁ rm arguments that the political sphere 
in post-communist countries is strongly gendered. The problem is that the more 
women or sexual minorities are actively engaged in politics, the more informa-
tion they have about issues that concern them; by contrast, those who are politi-
cally disengaged tend to accept stereotypes about gender roles as matters of fact 
[Sokolová 2006, 2009].
First of all, we should keep in mind that the observed effects of the social 
stratiﬁ cation variables are reduced by the large set of control variables in the anal-
ysis. Turning to those variables, the effect of age goes in the direction expected, 
though the strength of the coefﬁ cients are substantially stronger for voting than 
for other forms of participation. There are also virtually no material differences in 
the effects of age between East and West. Second, respondents residing in villages 
are more likely to vote and engage in the more conventional political actions, 
whereas respondents in cities are more likely to protest (participate in demon-
strations and to boycott). In the post-communist countries, urban residents are 
signiﬁ cantly less likely to work in political parties than urban residents in West-
ern Europe. Post-communist villagers are also less likely to sign petitions com-
pared to other residents and with villagers in Western countries. 
Third, trade union members are not only more likely to engage in dem-
onstrations, but in all other forms of participation as well. Union members in 
post-communist countries are more likely to work in political organisations 
and sign petitions; but besides that, there seems to be no other cross-regional 
differences in union behaviour. Fourth, participation also increases with religi-
osity in both East and West, but substantially more so with the so-called ‘con-
ventional’ forms of action than ‘protest’ ones. Lastly, students have nearly the 
opposite behavioural pattern of participation compared to religious respondents. 
There are also no observed differences in the political behaviour of students be-
tween East and West, and relatively small differences in the case of the role of re-
ligiosity. 
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In terms of the explanatory power of the models in Table 2, the role of po-
litical interests, political satisfaction, and social networks are important. As ex-
pected, political interests are very strong predictors of all forms of political par-
ticipation, though the coefﬁ cients for voting, contacting politicians, and working 
in organisations are signiﬁ cantly weaker in the post-communist countries. Social 
networks – i.e. how often respondents socialise and meet with friends – are also 
very strong predictors of all forms of political participation, above all for working 
in organisations and political parties. The effect is weaker for protest actions in 
post-communist countries (especially for demonstrations), though even in those 
countries social networks generally play an important role in generating partici-
pation. In contrast to political interests and social networks, the effects of political 
satisfaction vary according to the type of participation: more satisfaction leads 
to greater chances of voting, but is negatively associated with engaging in most 
other forms of action, either conventional or protest. This ﬁ nding contradicts the 
hypothesis that people engaging in so-called conventional forms of action would 
be more satisﬁ ed with political life than people who engage in protest activity. 
The only differences between East and West is that wearing badges is a sign of 
political satisfaction in the East (i.e. political satisfaction increases the odds of 
wearing badges, whereas in the West the odds decline), and that political satisfac-
tion decreases the odds of participating in demonstrations in the West, whereas 
there is no such effect in the East. 
One of the surprising ﬁ ndings in the table concerns the role of social trust. 
Trust turned out to be a particularly weak predictor of many forms of participa-
tion other than voting, contacting politicians and working in organisations. While 
there is signiﬁ cant empirical evidence that social trust impacts civic participation, 
clearly it is not a prerequisite for political participation in the East or West. The 
ﬁ nding thus raises the important question of how civic and political participation 
are linked, and why social trust impacts one but not the other. Given the rela-
tively large literature on social trust, it is surprising that relatively little is known 
about its lack of association to many forms of political participation across a wide 
set of countries.
Lastly, compared to other studies of the determinants of political participa-
tion, the explanatory power of the models is rather good. Many of the models 
have pseudo R-square values around .20 or more, which is considerably higher 
than the strength of association between predicted and actual values reported 
in other analyses of the same ESS political participation data [Caínzos, Ferrin 
and Voces 2007; Gallego 2007]. Further, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test of model 
ﬁ t indicates that most of the models exhibit very good ﬁ t with the data. As a 
reminder, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test computes chi-squares by dividing re-
spondents into deciles based on predicted probabilities. If the statistic is .05 or 
less (which we do not want), we reject the null hypothesis that there is no differ-
ence in the observed and predicted values of the dependent variables, but if it is 
over .05 (which we do want), we fail to reject the null hypothesis, i.e. we can say 
that the model ﬁ ts that data in a satisfactory manner.
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Measures of ﬁ t are useful for countering arguments that models of politi-
cal behaviour cannot coherently explain political participation [Matsusaka and 
Palda 1999]. If all of the variables discussed above account for only a minority of 
the variation in the dependent variable, it suggests either that other important 
variables have been omitted from the analysis, or that a large degree of political 
behaviour is random and thus unexplainable. While the latter view is consistent 
with the rational choice claim that relatively small, immeasurable increases in 
cost, such as bad weather, can have large effects on political behaviour, the data 
do not necessarily lead us to conclude that that view is correct.
Conclusion
The analyses above enable us to conclude that, 15 years after the collapse of com-
munism (i.e. at the time of the ESS survey), the post-communist context continues 
to have a number of important indirect, but not direct, effects on political partici-
pation. Our main hypothesis was conﬁ rmed that the social stratiﬁ cation variables 
– occupational status, education, and gender – play a heightened role in pre-
dicting participation in the East, indicating that there is more inequality in par-
ticipation in that region. In fact, East-West differences seem to be stronger in the 
stratiﬁ cation variables than in any of the other sociological variables we have ex-
amined. The differences are particularly strong with gender inequality, as women 
in post-communist societies are much less likely to engage in protest behaviour 
compared to Western women, while they are just as likely to be excluded from 
the more conventional forms of behaviour. The combination of these variables 
indicate that political participation in post-communist countries is more strati-
ﬁ ed than in the West, despite relatively similar laws and rights to participation in 
most of the countries examined. 
Does non-electoral political participation increase or decrease social in-
equalities in electoral behaviour? While we did not test for the signiﬁ cance of 
the differences in coefﬁ cients between voting and other forms of participation, 
we can generally say that the coefﬁ cients for occupational status are lower for 
most forms of non-electoral participation in both the East and the West compared 
to the situation with voting. Education seems to play a substantially larger role 
in boycotting products and signing petitions compared to voting, and a slightly 
larger role in the conventional political actions. While we cannot directly answer 
the above question, it seems to be the case that inequalities in non-electoral po-
litical participation generally reﬂ ect political life as a whole, rather than being 
mechanisms that would drastically improve the ability of citizens of lower social 
status in having a larger say in political decision-making.
Some may criticise the approach taken in this article in that post-communist 
and Western democracies are too diverse to compare directly. To that I would 
counter that diversity does not prevent analytical comparison. Indeed, this re-
search has provided support to those critics by demonstrating the weak direct 
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effects of differences between East and West. We have found that country-spe-
ciﬁ c conditions (which explain 4–5% of the variance in the dependent variables) 
and individual-level variables explain what others might observe as the direct 
inﬂ uence of post-communist conditions. That is, when we observe that political 
participation is lower in Hungary than it is in France, this may be due to factors 
other than the communist heritage per se, such as country-level conditions we 
did not measure (e.g. GDP per capita, the size of the civil society). By the same 
token, similarities in participation rates in Poland and the Czech Republic may 
be due to similarities in economic and political conditions other than the direct 
effect of their common communist heritage. What we observe as a ‘communist 
legacy’ may actually be the effect of different, though related, political and eco-
nomic variables.
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify statistically signiﬁ cant differences be-
tween East and West – which could be attributed to the conditions of the post-
communist context – via interaction effects with individual-level variables. Fol-
lowing that approach, we have found some important differences in the degree 
of inequality in political participation between the two sets of countries. Overall, 
however, the differences between the two sets of countries are not particularly 
strong, especially in comparison to the larger literature about the ‘weakness of 
civil society’, political apathy, and other negative conditions of post-communist 
politics.
After 1989, one of the ﬁ rst objectives of the newly established democratic 
governments of Central and Eastern Europe was to pass electoral laws and con-
stitutionally enshrine rights to political participation. Two decades later, many of 
those countries are far along the path of democratic consolidation. Nonetheless, 
this article suggests that an important task for future democratic leaders is to 
improve upon the actions of the ﬁ rst post-communist generation by not only in-
stitutionalising more forms of political participation, but by improving the qual-
ity and opportunities of political participation so that the political arena is open, 
inclusive, and accessible to all citizens regardless of their social backgrounds.
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